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STATEMENT OF PARTIES
The parties are listed in the caption. In this brief, Plaintiff-Appellee Ira Sachs is
referred to as "Plaintiff Sachs." Defendants-Appellants Joseph S. Lesser and Loeb
Investors, Inc. are referred to as "Lesser" and "Loeb", and in some citations collectively
as "L&L". Defendant-Appellant United Park City Mines Company and former defendant
Capital Growth Partners, Inc., are referred to as "UPCM" and "Capital." Defendants'
opening brief is referred to as "Def. Br." All statutory references are to Utah Code Ann.
(1953), as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that the Utah Real Estate

Brokers Act ("UREBA"), §§61-2-1, et. seq., does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claims for
breach of implied contract because an agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a
corporation in exchange for a fee, involves only personal property, and is thus not "a
business opportunity involving real property" within the definition of a "real estate"
under §61-2-2(14) of UREBA?
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the trial court. Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2007
UT 19, f7, 154 P.3d 802. The Utah Supreme Court reviews Court of Appeals'
interpretation of a statute for correctness. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, f!6, 164 P.3d 384.
1

2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that §25-5-4 of the Utah

statute of frauds does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claims for breach of implied contract
because an oral agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a corporation in exchange for a
fee, involves only personal property, and is thus not an agreement to sell real property
under §25-5-4 of the Utah statute of frauds?
Standard of Review: Application of the statute of frauds is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430,
1J22, 124 P.2d 269, citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, Tf23, 44 P.3d 742.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND RULES
1.

The Utah Real Estate Brokers Act ("UREBA"), §61-2-1 el seq., (2005),

Addendum 2
2.

Provisions of current and prior versions of UREBA containing definitions

of "business opportunity" and "real estate" in UREBA, Addendum 3
3.

Utah statute of frauds, §25-5-4 (2004), Addendum 4

4.

Utah R.Civ.P. 56, Addendum 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I

Nature of the Case
This is an action for breach of implied contract to enforce a finder's fee agreement

that arose when Lesser, as Chairman of the Board of UPCM and President of Loeb, the
majority stockholder group of UPCM, requested Plaintiff Sachs, a business consultant in
Park City, Utah, to find a buyer for UPCM, a publicly traded corporation on the New
2

York Stock Exchange, after receiving written notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected
for his services. Plaintiff Sachs was not licensed as a real estate broker at the time.
Plaintiff Sachs did not offer or agree to find a buyer for UPCM's business, or any of its
real property assets, but only to find a buyer for the corporation in response to Lesser's
request.
Subsequently, Plaintiff Sachs located one Gerald Jackson ("Jackson") to purchase
UPCM. After speaking with Sachs, Jackson formed a company, Capital, that
subsequently acquired UPCM by purchasing 100% of UPCM's outstanding common
stock in a complex merger transaction in which UPCM, Lesser and Loeb were
represented by numerous attorneys and an investment banking firm. In the merger,
UPCM was the surviving corporation and retained all of its assets, including its real
property assets. Sachs played no part in the merger transaction.
Following the merger, Lesser and UPCM's President, Hank Rothwell, refused to
pay Sachs' finder's fee based on a ruse that Jackson was already in a deal with Rothwell
to purchase UPCM at the time Sachs contacted Jackson to buy UPCM. After making
extensive, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to negotiate the payment of the finder's
fee, Plaintiff Sachs brought this action, asserting claims against Lesser, Loeb, UPCM and
Capital, for breach of contract implied in fact or law and other claims not relevant to this
appeal.

3

II

Course of Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts
Plaintiff Sachs filed his Complaint on January 21, 2004. (R.l-24) On February 23,

2004, Lesser and Loeb moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the subject
finder's fee agreement was barred by the New York Statute of Frauds. (R. 51-53) UPCM
and Capital joined the motion. (R. 54-57) On September 27, 2004, Judge Bruce C.
Lubeck heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss (R. 156) and on September 29,
2004, issued a Ruling and Order denying the motion to dismiss. (R. 157-192)
On October 13, 2004, UPCM and Capital filed their Answer (R. 193-206) and on
October 15, 2004, Lesser and Loeb filed their Answer. (R. 207-218)
On January 20, 2005, Capital filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground
that Capital was not a party to the finder's fee agreement and or otherwise not liable for
its alleged breach as a successor to UPCM. (R. 525-568)
On February 5, 2005, Plaintiff Sachs filed a Verification of his Complaint.
(R. 666-668)
On March 31, 2005, Lesser and Loeb filed a motion for summary judgment. (R.
1082-1084) On April 8, 2005, UPCM filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 12061208)
On September 13, 2005, the district court granted Capital's motion for summary
judgment, which Plaintiff Sachs does not appeal. (R. 2191-2190) On December 12, 2005,
the district court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment of Lesser,
Loeb and UPCM. (R. 2205) On February 15, 2006, the district court entered an Order

4

granting the Defendants' motions and dismissing Plaintiffs1 claims in this action (Final
Judgment). (R. 2213-2222)
On March 16, 2006, Plaintiff Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 2224-2225)
This Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 23, 2006. (R.
2228) The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument on March 26, 2007.
On May 17, 2007, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion affirming in part
and reversing and remanding in part the decision of the district court. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing Sachs' express contract claim, and
reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment and dismissing Sachs'
implied contract claims based on the presence of a disputed issue of fact as to whether
Plaintiff Sachs procured Jackson as the buyer for UPCM. Finally, the Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's decisions that UREBA and the Utah statute of frauds bar
Plaintiff Sachs' claims and remanded the case to the district court for trial on the merits.
Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT 169 ("Sachs"), attached as Addendum 1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The facts relevant to the legal issues on which certiorari was granted are as
follows:1
1.

Plaintiff Ira Sachs is a long time resident of Park City, Utah, and a

shareholder in UPCM at all relevant times. For many years, Mr. Sachs has worked as a
business consultant in Park City. See, "Plaintiffs Statement of Facts", Plaintiffs Mem.

1

Plaintiff Sachs' full Statement of Facts presented to the Court of Appeals is set forth
in the "Brief of Appellant", at 5-22.
5

Op. Lesser and Loeb Motion For Summary Judgment, ("Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L"), 111-3,
R.1321; "Statement of Facts", Plaintiffs Mem. Op. UPCM Motion For Summary
Judgment, ("Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM"), f 1-3, R. 1624-1625; Verified Complaint, f 1, 1819, R. 2,4-5; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1361-1362, at 20:8-24:16; Sachs Affidavit, 1f5-6,
R.1442; Sachs UPCM stock certificate, R.1482-1483.
2.

Defendant Lesser was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the

UPCM, and the President of Loeb, the controlling shareholder group of UCPM, and
conducted business of UCPM and Loeb within the State of Utah, at all relevant times.
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L,ffl[4-5,R. 1321-1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM,ffl[4-5, R. 1625;
Verified Complaint,ffif3,13,R- 2; Answer of Lesser and Loeb, \2, R. 208 (partially
admitting allegations); Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1402 at 18:17-21:24.
3.

UPCM was a publicly traded New York Stock Exchange company, and

maintained its principal place of business, operations and stockholder meetings, within
the State of Utah at all relevant times. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, \6, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem.
Op. UPCM, \6, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, 1J4, R-2; Sachs Affidavit,ffl[7,9, R.14421443; Lesser Dep. R. 1397, 1402 at 21:2-24.
4.

The principal business of UPCM was the leasing, development and sale of

its real property in Utah. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, \1, R.1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM,
Jl, R. 1625; Verified Complaint,ffi[10-l1, R. 3-4.
5.

Hank Rothwell, the President of the UPCM, ("Rothwell"), conducted the

business of UPCM at its principal offices in Park City, Utah, at all relevant times. See,

6

Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 8, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f 8, R. 1625; Verified
Complaint, ^[12, R. 4; Rothwell Dep. R. 1391, 1394, at 140:1-4.
6.

In addition to serving as officers of UPCM, Lesser and Rothwell were

experienced and licensed real estate brokers and investors at all relevant times. See, Pltf.
Mem. Op. L&L,ffi[64-65,R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffl64-65, R. 1634; Lesser
Real Estate License Record, R.1479; Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1400-1402, at 13:15-24;
14:11-16; 16:13-17:18; 18:17-20:9; Rothwell Real Estate License Verification, R. 14801481; Rothwell Dep. R. 1391, 1392, at 10:16-12:25; 1398, at 199:23-25.
7.

At the time of the events referred herein, Plaintiff Sachs had known

Rothwell for 15 to 20 years. Rothwell knew Sachs was a deal maker and business
consultant who worked on a fee basis. Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, *[f9, R.1322; Pltf. Mem. Op.
UPCM, Tf9, R. 1626; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1365, at 51:1-6.
8.

In early 2001, Plaintiff Sachs learned of the failure of a joint venture

between UPCM and DMB and introduced one of his clients, Granite Land Company, to
Rothwell as a potential joint venturer for UPCM by March 2001. Granite signed a
confidentiality agreement with UPCM and subsequently engaged in negotiations
regarding a possible joint venture or purchase of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1fl[l 113, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM,fflfl1-13, R. 1626; Verified Complaint, 1ffl20-22, R.
5, Sachs Dep. 1357, 1363-1366, at 42:16-51:23; 62:1-13; Rothwell Dep. R. 1709, 1719,
at 139:22-140:19.
9.

On or about May 2, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs met with Lesser and a mutual

friend at Lesser's private club in New York City. During the meeting, Lesser expressed
7

his strong displeasure regarding Rothwell's handling of the failed UPCM joint venture
with DMB, stating that, "I do not think Hank Rothwell is capable of running a New York
Stock Exchange company." Lesser also told Sachs that he and Loeb had lost faith in
Rothwell and did not want to invest any more money in UPCM. Lesser requested Sachs
help him locate a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible,
importuning Sachs to "get the job done, whether it's with Granite, or someone else, or a
combination." See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L,ffi[14-15,R- 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffifl415, R. 1626-1627; Verified Complaint,ffi[23-26,R. 5-6; Sachs Dep. R. 1357, 1367-1369,
at 67:12-69:12; 73:23-81:15; Lesser Dep.R. 1399, 1405, at 47:18- 48:5; Jackson Dep. R.
1454, R. 1459, at 22:11-18.
10.

Although the specific amount of the finder's fee was not discussed at their

May 2, 2001 meeting, both Lesser and Sachs understood that Plaintiff Sachs would
receive a usual and customary finder's fee for his efforts. A usual and customary fee for
assisting in locating a buyer for a company is 3% of the sale price of the corporation. See,
Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 16, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, If 16, R. 1627; Verified
Complaint, 1(28-29, R. 6; Sachs Dep. R. 1357, 1373, at 95:23-96:16; 1384-1386145:8148:8; 149:15-150:5; Tesch Memo, R. 1484.
11.

Plaintiff Sachs does not have a real estate broker's license and was not

acting as a broker, but as a professional business finder, in locating a buyer for UPCM, a
New York Stock Exchange company, in response to Lesser's request. See, Pltf. Mem. Op.
L&L, H63, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, | 6 3 , R. 1634; Sachs Dep. R. 1357, 13841385, 147:20-148:8.
8

12.

Following the May 2, 2001 meeting with Lesser, Plaintiff Sachs contacted

several individuals to purchase UPCM, including Jackson. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L,
fl9, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f 19, R. 1627; Verified Complaint, p 3 , R. 7; Sachs
Dep. R. 1357, 1371-1372 at 88:1-90:14; 90:25-92:19.
13.

On the morning of May 17, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs delivered a letter to

Rothwell regarding Sachs' prior introduction of Granite and the finder's fee he expected
for locating a joint venturer or buyer for UPCM, stating
I write to remind you that I will expect a modest finder's fee if an
agreement comes to fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime
developed lots in the new project, or some other consideration
acceptable to both of us. While I believe we have an understanding as
to this finder's fee, I do think that matters of this sort ought to be out
on the table early on, and I hope you feel the same. Please let me
know if you have any questions concerning such a finder's fee.
See, Pltf Mem. Op. L&L, f27, R. 1325-1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^|27, R. 1629;
Verified Complaint,fflJ43,R. 9; Letter to Rothwell from Sachs, R. 1478; Sachs Dep., R.
1357, 1383-1384, at 141:11-143:6; 1386 at 152:23-153:13; Rothwell Dep., R. 1391, 1395
at 152:7-18.
14.

Plaintiff Sachs' letter of May 17, 2001, was received by Rothwell and

transmitted to Lesser. Later that afternoon, Lesser telephoned Sachs. Responding to
Sachs' indication in the letter that Sachs would direct his efforts to finding a "potential
buyer" or "joint venturer" for UPCM, Lesser adamantly told Sachs that, "I don't want a
joint venture partner. I want this sold." Lesser directed Sachs to refer any prospective
purchasers of UPCM to Rothwell. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1HJ30-31, R. 1326; Pltf.
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Mem. Op. UPCM,ffi[30-31,R. 1629; Verified Complaint, 1fl[44-45, R. 9; Sachs Dep., R.
1357, 1387-1388 at 156:19-157:23; 159:21-161:24.
15.

The following day, May 18, 2001, Sachs delivered a second letter to

Rothwell by facsimile, confirming Lesser's preference for a purchaser for UPCM
expressed in Lesser's phone call to Sachs on May 17, 2001. In the letter, Sachs further
stated that, "If your company's preference is sale, Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's
letter is still an excellent prospect. Another investor, together with Granite, would make
an excellent purchaser. I am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a joint venture
purchaser. Obviously, I will keep you apprised of all proposals, whether for sale or for a
joint venturing of the project." Rothwell and Lesser never responded to this letter or
informed Sachs they would not pay the finder's fee Sachs had indicated he would charge
for his services in the letter of May 17, 2001. See, Letter to Rothwell from Sachs dated
May 18, 2001, R. 1453; Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^[33, R. 1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^[33,
R. 1630; Verified Complaint, 1J45, R. 9; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1387-1388 at 154:13158:11; R. 1390 at 210:1-211:4; Rothwell Dep. R. 1391, 1396 at 167:21-168:3.
16.

At all relevant times, Jackson resided in Park City, Utah. Although not

licensed as a real estate broker, Jackson has been a real estate developer in the Park City
area for over fifteen years. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^[66, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op.
UPCM, f66, R. 1634; Jackson Dep., R. 1454, 1455 at 5:6-24; 1457, at 15:10-17; 1465 at
108:5-109:12.
17.

Plaintiff Sachs initially telephoned Jackson in early June 2000 and reached

Jackson in New York. Jackson expressed immediate interest in the information that
10

Sachs provided him concerning the new opportunity to purchase UPCM that existed
based on the information Lesser had conveyed to Sachs in their meeting on May 2, 2001.
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi|20-21, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1fl[20-2l, R. 16271628; Verified Complaint,ffi[33-35,R - 7 ; S a c h s
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> 1376-1378, at 112:22-

118:12; Jackson Dep. R. 1454, 1457-1459 at 17:23-18:16; 22:9-18.
18.

On July 31,2001, Jackson formed Capital Growth Partners ("Capital"), a

Utah limited liability company, involving a group of investors, for the express purpose of
purchasing UPCM by acquiring 100% of the capital stock of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op.
L&L, flU, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f U , R. 1631; Verified Complaint, f51, R.10;
Jackson Dep., R. 1454, 1456-1457 at 12:5-13:23; 16:5-17:4; Merger Agreement, under
heading "Background of the Merger", R. 153 8.
19.

On October 25, 2001, Capital entered into a non-disclosure agreement with

DRKW, an investment banking firm hired by UPCM to facilitate the purchase of UPCM.
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^44, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f44, R. 1631; Verified
Complaint, ^[56, R. 11; See also, Merger Agreement, under heading "Background of the
Merger", R. 1527 (sixth paragraph).
20.

On February 21, 2002, Capital offered to purchase UPCM from its current

shareholders, including the stock of Loeb Investors, for $25 per share, for a total of
approximately $81.3 million. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f!5, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op.
UPCM, TJ45, R. 1631; See also, Merger Agreement, under heading "Background of the
Merger", R. 1528 ffi3-4).
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21.

Thereafter, in March and April, 2002, Plaintiff Sachs personally contacted

Defendants concerning the payment of his finder's fee which Defendamts refused to pay.
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f!6, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, fl6, R. 1631; Verified
Complaint, 1ffl59-64, R. 11-12; Sachs Affidavit, ffl[39-40, R. 1770.
22.

Lesser agrees that Plaintiff Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee

if Granite had purchased UPCM or if Sachs had located Jackson to purchase UPCM, but
denies that Plaintiff Sachs found Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L,
ffi[55, 61, R. 1329-1330; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM,ffi[55,61, R. 1632-1634; Lesser Dep. R.
1399, 1411-1412 at 129:6 -130:17.
23.

On or about June 16, 2003, Jackson, through Capital, completed a merger

with UPCM, by purchasing "all of the outstanding common stock" of UPCM, for $21
per share, for a total of $67.2 million. In the merger, UPCM became a wholly owned
subsidiary of Capital. UPCM was the surviving corporation in the merger and retained all
of its assets and liabilities, including its real estate assets. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^[49,
R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, |49, R. 1632; Verified Complaint, f82, R. 14; Jackson
Dep., R. 892, 900, at 80:10-20; Rothwell Dep., R. 1391, 1396, at 169:3-25; Agreement
and Plan of Merger and Article I, Sec. 1.01 (a)-(d), R. 901-902.
24.

Subsequently, Plaintiff Sachs made additional requests to UPCM for the

payment of his fmderfs fee for locating Jackson to purchase UPCM, but Defendants also
denied these requests. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L,ffi[51-55,R. 1329; Pltf. Mem. Op.
UPCM, 1J51-55, R. 1632-1633; Verified Complaint, 1fl[81-86, R. 14-15; Sachs Affidavit,
^|44? R. 1449.
12

25.

The merger of UPCM and Capital was a complicated commercial

transaction in which the parties' interests were represented by numerous attorneys and
consultants. Defendants were also represented by DRKW, an investment banking firm.
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 11J66-67, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM,ffl[66-67,R. 1634;
Merger Agreement, "Information Statement", R. 1521-1533; Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1403,
at 36:18-37:4; Jackson Dep. R. 1454, 1457, at 15:10-17.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I

Sachs' Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of UPCM For A
Fee Is Not A "Real Estate" Transaction under UREBA. Thus, UREBA
Does Not Bar Sachs' Claims For Breach of Implied Contract Because
Sachs Was Not Licensed As A Real Estate Broker Under UREBA
Applying familiar rules of statutory construction declared by this Court, the Utah

Court of Appeals correctly reversed the lower court's summary judgment and dismissal
of Plaintiff Sachs' implied contract claims against Defendants. The Court of Appeals
reached this decision based on its conclusion that Sachs' agreement to find a buyer for
100% of the stock of UPCM, a publicly held corporation, in exchange for a finder's fee,
where the corporation retained its real property assets in the transaction, involves only
stock which is recognized as "personal property" under Utah law, such that the agreement
is not a "business opportunity involving real property" within the definition of "real
estate" under §61-2-2 (14) of UREBA.
Although Defendants assail the Utah Court of Appeals' decision with a scattershot
of claims to the effect that the phrase "business opportunity involving real property" in
UREBA should be interpreted as encompassing transactions exclusively involving
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corporate stock, many of these claims were never presented, briefed or argued in the
district court or in the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court should decline to consider these
new claims on certiorari.
Defendants also fail to counter the Utah Court of Appeals' conclusions that the
rules of statutory construction, legislative history, purposes and policies of UREBA, the
long established treatment of stock as personal property and not real property under Utah
law, as well as the due process notice required to be afforded citizens concerning conduct
punishable as civil and criminal offenses under UREBA, all support the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of UREBA. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the Utah Court
of Appeals' decision that UREBA does not bar Sachs' claims for breach of implied
contract.
II

Sachs' Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of A
Corporation For A Fee Is Not An "Agreement Involving The Sale
Or Purchase Of Real Estate" Under §25-5-4 of the Utah Statute Of
Frauds. Thus, the Statute Does Not Bar Plaintiff Sachs' Claims For
Breach of Implied Contract
The Court of Appeals correctly held that even accepting, without deciding,

Defendants' argument that the definition of "real estate" in UREBA should be read "in
para materia" to supply the definition of "real estate" in §25-5-4(1 )(e) of the Utah statute
of frauds, Sachs' agreement to find a buyer for the stock of UPCM involves only
"personal property" and not the "the purchase or sale of real property" under §25-5-4.
This conclusion is buttressed by the facts that there is nothing in the Utah statute of
frauds indicating that it is intended to be defined according to the terms of UREBA, and
that §70A-8-l 12 prohibits the application of the statute of frauds to contracts for the sale
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of securities. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Utah Court of Appeals' decision
that the Utah statute of frauds does not bar Sachs' claims against Defendants for breach
of implied contract.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

A,

UREBA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF SACHS5 CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT BECAUSE UREBA DOES
NOT REQUIRE A REAL ESTATE BROKER LICENSE TO
ENGAGE IN TRANSACTIONS DEALING EXCLUSIVELY IN
CORPORATE STOCK

An Agreement To Find A Buyer For A Corporation's Stock In Exchange For
A Fee Is Not Regulated Under UREBA
Plaintiff Sachs does not dispute Defendants' arguments that one must be licensed

as a real estate broker to recover a fee for finding a buyer for the real property assets of a
corporation under UREBA, or that this Court so held in Diversified General Corp. v.
White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848, 849, 852 (Utah 1978) (Def. Br. 14, n.4). In this
case, however, Plaintiff Sachs never offered or agreed to find a buyer for any business, or
any real property assets of UPCM, and Lesser, on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, only
requested Plaintiff Sachs to find a buyer for the corporation. See, Plaintiffs Statement of
Facts, supra, ffi|8-20, 22,23, 25, at 7-13; See also, Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1385 at 147:12148:8. It is also undisputed that the buyer Plaintiff Sachs claims he found to purchase
UPCM, acquired the corporation by purchasing 100% of UPCM's common stock in a
merger in which UPCM was the surviving corporation and retained its real property
assets. (Rothwell Dep., R. 1381, 1396, at 169:25; Agreement and Plan of Merger and
Article I, §1.01 (a)-(d), R. 901-902.) Thus, whereas Diversified involved an action by a
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corporation to collect a finder's fee for locating a purchaser for the vendor's "real
property" Id. at 848, the instant case involves exclusively the sale of corporate stock,
which the Court of Appeals correctly held is "personal property" and not "real property"
within the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA.2 Sachs, 1J40-43
Similarly, the facts that "UPCM's only significant asset consisted of land" (Def.
Br. 14), and that "Sachs did not have a real estate broker's license at the time he found a
buyer for UPCM" (Def. Br. 14-15), do not preclude Sachs' finder's fee agreement as
Defendants contend, because the agreement only involved the sale of UPCM's stock, and
did not involve the sale of any land owned by UPCM for which a broker's license would
be required under UREBA. Sachs, 1fl3, 40
Defendants further argue that, "Sachs alleges that he was the procuring cause of
UPCM's sale." (Def. Br. 14) However, this allegation only refers to Sachs'
representation that he "procured" a buyer for UPCM. (Letter from Sachs to Rothwell, R.
1289; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1385 at 147:12-148:8) As Defendants admit, the terms of the
sale of UPCM "were negotiated and concluded without Sachs' involvement" and
"consummated as a corporate merger in which Capital purchased all outstanding shares
of UPCM's corporate stock." (Def. Br. 14). These admissions are significant because, as
the Court of Appeals explained, "The term 'procuring cause' has different meanings with
respect to finders and brokers, and that to recover a fee as a finder, Plaintiff Sachs "need

2 The events of this case occurred during 2001-2002. However, the definition of "real
estate" in UREBA in §61-2-2(14) has not changed in the interim. Thus, the Utah Court of
Appeals refers to the 2006 version of UREBA. See, Sachs, 1fl[33-34, 48, n.23.
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only demonstrate that he introduced the parties who eventually consummated the
transaction." Sachs,ffif28-29
Accordingly, none of the facts asserted by Defendants (Def. Mem. 13-15),
demonstrate that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the sale of UPCM's
stock is not a "business opportunity involving real property" under the definition of "real
estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, and that Plaintiff Sachs is not required to be licensed
under UREBA to enforce his finder's fee agreement with Defendants.
B.

The Phrase "Business Opportunity Involving Real Property" Is Ambiguous
Defendants assert that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that the phrase

"business opportunity involving real estate" is ambiguous. (Def. Mem. 16) This argument
is incorrect.
As the Court of Appeals observed, "Neither the term 'business opportunity' nor
the phrase 'business opportunity involving real property' used in the definition of 'real
estate' is further defined in this chapter." Sachs, p 6 , ("Real estate... include[s]
leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property."), citing §61-2-2(14),
Addendum 2. The subject phrase is also distinguishable from the terms "business" and
"corporation." These terms are also undefined in UREBA. Id.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties advanced two conflicting
interpretations of the subject phrase:
Defendants assume that the proper inquiry [under the phrase "business
opportunity involving real property"] is whether the ongoing business
being conveyed engages in commercial activities involving real
property. In contrast, Sachs argues that the sale of UPCM fell outside
UREBA's definition of real estate because only stock was sold.
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Sachs, f 36.
Confronted with conflicting interpretations and the undefined terms in the subject
phrase, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the phrase "business
opportunities involving real property" is ambiguous, based on its finding that,
[W]hen we consider the plain language of the Act in its entirety, it is
unclear from that language alone whether Sachs was required to
comply with UREBA when finding a buyer for all of UPCM's stock.
Sachs, \ 38; See also, Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ^[33, 131 P.3d
208, 216 ("Absent clear language regarding or an obvious interpretation of [the statutory
language] ..., we conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous. It is clearly capable
of more than one logical meaning within the statutory scheme.")
The fact that the Utah Court of Appeals held that the sale of UPCM's stock was
not barred by UREBA while the district court held that it was, also demonstrates that the
definition of "real estate" in UREBA is "susceptible of two interpretations" and is thus
ambiguous. Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ^69, 167 P.3d
1016, 1035 (cited Def. Br. 16) ("The term 'unincorporated area' as used in this statute is
ambiguous in that it is susceptible to two interpretations."); Li v. Zhang, 2005 UT App
246, \ 8, 120 P.3d 30, 32, affd, Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Utah, 2006 UT 80,
150 P.3d 471 ("However, this existence of two reasonable, yet conflicting,
interpretations of the statute renders it ambiguous.") Accordingly, Defendants' argument
that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that the phrase "business opportunities
involving real estate" is ambiguous, is incorrect and must be rejected.
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C.

Defendants' Interpretation Of The Phrase "Business Opportunities Involving
Real Property" Renders the Word "Opportunities" Meaningless In Violation
of Basic Rules of Statutory Construction
Defendants argue that the proper inquiry under the phrase "business opportunities

involving real property, " is whether an existing, ongoing business engages in
commercial activities involving real property. (Def. Br. 15) See also, Sachs, f36.
The Court of Appeals soundly rejected this interpretation, reasoning that,
Had the legislature defined real estate to include businesses involving
real property, we would agree that UREBA is applicable. The plain
language of the statute, however, includes only business
opportunities. See, Utah Code Ann. §61-2-2(14). Thus, Defendants'
interpretation would render the word 'opportunities' meaningless,
something we must avoid when possible.
Sachs, 1J1|38-39, citing Carter v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2006 UT 78,1J9
("Determining the legislature's intent requires that we seek to render all parts [of the
statute] relevant and meaningful and we accordingly avoid interpretations that will render
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.")
D.

The Ordinary Meaning of "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property"
Does Not Include The Sale of Corporate Stock Where the Corporation
Retains Its Real Estate Assets In The Transaction
Defendants belatedly claim that the Court of Appeals was constrained to interpret

the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" according to the default
definition of "real property" in §68-3-12(2)(k), and the dictionary definitions of the
individual words "business" and "opportunities" supplied by Defendants, thereby
purportedly avoiding ambiguity in the subject phrase. (Def. Br. 16-18) Defendants did
not present, brief or argue these specific definitions in the district court or in the Court of
Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 121819

1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM Ct App. Br. 15-33. Thus, this Court
should decline to consider them. "With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has
been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal." Tindley v. Salt
Lake City School Disl, 2005 UT 30,1J10, n. 2, 116 P.3d 295, quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake
City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). If the rule were otherwise, a party
addressing a motion for summary judgment could, as in the instant case, withhold a slew
of issues and arguments until the highest level of appeal, forcing the opposing party to
address them in the strictures of the appellate briefing schedule.
Defendants also failed to comply with U.R.App.P. 24(a)(9), which requires parties
to include in their appellate briefs, "the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in
the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied
upon." In their opening brief, Defendants fail to advance any grounds on which this Court
should consider the new claims Defendants failed to present or brief in the lower courts.
For this additional reason, the Court should decline to consider Defendants' argument on
this point and the other new claims asserted for the first time on certiorari.
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants5 argument
on this point (Def. Br. 16-18), is unavailing. If anything, the default definition of "real
estate" and "real property" in §68-3-12(2)(k), as meaning "land, hereditaments, water
rights, possessory rights, and claims" (Def. Br. 16), supports the exclusion of corporate
stock transactions from the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" in
§61-2-2(14), because there is no reference to stock transactions in the default definitions
of these terms.
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Indeed, transactions involving only corporate stock fall within the default
definition of "personal property" in §68-3-12(2)(p), which includes "every description of
money, goods, chattels, effects, evidence of rights in action, and all written instruments
by which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to property is created, acknowledged,
transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every right or interest
therein." See also, Sachs, f41, quoting §16-10a-102(33) (2005) (defining "shares" in a
corporation to mean "the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are
divided.")
Although courts "frequently consults] dictionary definitions to assess the
'ordinary meaning' of an otherwise undefined term" (Def. Br. 17), Defendants5 attempt
to interpret the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" soley by reference
to definitions for the individual words in the phrase, apart from the other provisions of
UREBA and its statutory purpose, violates basic laws of statutory interpretation. "We
read the plain language of a statute ... as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and
related chapters." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f7, 162 P.3d 1099 (Internal citations
omitted); Sachs, ^[39, n. 15, ("[U]pon finding that the plain language of a statute is
ambiguous, we are free to 'look to other interpretive tools.' Utah State Tax Comm yn v.
Stevenson, 2006 UT 84,1J32, 150 P.3d 521.")
Thus, the Court of Appeals was not required to adopt Defendants' proposed
definitions for the words in the phrase "business opportunities involving real property"
used in the definition of "real estate" under §61-2-2(14), where Defendants never
21

presented, briefed or argued these definitions in the district court or the Utah Court of
Appeals, and other accepted interpretive tools of statutory construction satisfied the Court
of Appeals that its interpretation of the statutory phrase was correct. Sachs, ^[37-42
(discussing rules of statutory construction applied by Court of Appeals)
E.

The Phrase "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property" Should Not Be
Interpreted According To The Prior Deleted Statutory Definition of
"Business Opportunity"
1.

The Prior Deleted Statutory Definition Of "Business Opportunity" Is
Ambiguous And Would Not Resolve The Issue Of Statutory
Interpretation Presented In This Case Even If Adopted

Defendants also belatedly claim that "[i]f this Court concludes the phrase
'business opportunities involving real property' is ambiguous, the legislative history of
the key provisions of UREBA compels this Court to apply a definition consonant with the
previous statutory definition [of "business opportunity]." (Def. Br. 18) Defendants cite
no legal authority to support this claim and failed to present, brief or airgue this claim in
the district court or in the Court of Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 20682082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM
Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Thus, the Court should decline to consider it. "With limited
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for
the first time on appeal." Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 QT 30, ^flO, n. 2,
116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413
(Utah 1990).
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants' argument
on this point is incorrect. Defendants fail to acknowledge that the definition of "business
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opportunity" that existed prior to the 1985 amendments to UREBA, which then included
"an existing business and its good will," is itself ambiguous, such that its application
would not resolve the issue of statutory interpretation presented in the instant case. See,
1963 Amendments, at 11-13; 1983 Amendments, at 14, 16, Addendum 3.
In 1978, the Utah Attorney General issued an informal opinion responding to a
query from the Department of Business Regulation asking whether the purchase of a
corporation's stock was a "business opportunity", a securities transaction, or neither. See,
Informal Opinion No. 78-233, 1978 WL 257892 (Utah A.G.), Addendum 8.
Construing the 1963 version of UREBA which then defined the term "business
opportunity" as including "an existing business and its good will," the Attorney General
concluded that the definition of "business opportunity" was ambiguous, observing that,
"[B]ut the statute does not specify what type of sale of a business opportunity would be
so subject, whether the assets of a business must be sold or merely a controlling share in
the corporation." The Attorney General further opined that
A Utah court would probably find a sale of controlling share of stock
in a corporation too far removed in nature from a real estate
transaction to fall within the term 'real estate' as defined by Section
21-2-2. There are too many variables involved in determining what
constitutes a sale of control of a corporation. Less tha[n] 51% may be
sufficient to control for certain purposes. To avoid any disputes
which may arise from the nebulous definition of the term 'control' it
would be best to adopt a mechanical rule to the effect that only sales
of assets of a business qualify as a sale of a 'business opportunity'
under the statute.
Id. at I.

Because application of the statutory definition of "business opportunity" that
existed prior to the 1985 amendments to UREBA repealing this definition, would not
23

resolve the ambiguity of the statute for the reasons cited by the Attorney General,
Defendants' untimely argument that the Court of Appeals erred in not adopting the
deleted definition, is incorrect and must be rejected.
2.

The Court of Appeals Was Not Required To Apply The Prior
Statutory Definition Of "Business Opportunity" Deleted By The
Legislature

Notwithstanding Defendants' contrary argument (Def. Br. 18-21), a court is not
required to interpret a statutory provision in a manner that is consistent with a previous
statutory provision when the prior statutory provision has been repealed. See, Bourgeous
v. State, 2002 UT App 5, \\1, 41 P.3d 461, citing §68-3-5 (2000): "The repeal of a statute
does not revive a statute previously repealed."
In determining the meaning of the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), "we assume
that 'the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of the other.'"
Bourgeous, %L\, quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ^[14, 993 P.2d
875. Thus, had the legislature intended the pre-1985 definition of "real estate" in §61-22(14), which included "an existing business, a business and its good will, a business
franchise, or any combination of them" to be utilized in the current version of UREBA, it
would not have deleted this definition in the 1985 amendments to UREBA and added the
qualifying phrase "involving real property" to the term "business opportunities" in the
definition of "real estate" contained in §61-2-2(14). Sachs, ffif38-39
Legislative events prior to the adoption of the 1985 amendments to UREBA also
support the Court of Appeals' decision that the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14),
excludes the sale of corporate stock. As the Court of Appeals explains, the 1985
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amendments to UREBA followed in the wake of 1983 legislation that split real estate
licensing and enforcement from securities licensing and enforcement. Sachs, ^[47-48
Thus, to further implement this reorganization, "in 1985, the Utah Legislature contracted
the scope of the real estate broker's act in two ways. First, it narrowed the definition of
real estate by including the limiting phrase "involving real property".... Second, it
deleted "existing business, business and the good will attached thereto or any one of a
combination thereof from the expansive definition of "business opportunity." Sachs, Tf48
The legislature's determination to govern real estate and securities under different
chapters of the Utah Code, and the legislature's creation of exemptions effectively
abolishing the need for dual licensing in transactions in which real estate is a necessary
element of a security, also support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the legislature
did not intend to encompass the sale of a corporation's stock under the phrase "a business
opportunity involving real property" used in the definition of "real estate" under §61-22(14) of UREBA. Sachs,ffi[47-48> n-
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In light of the Defendants' failure to counter the foregoing legislative history (Def.
Br. 18-21), Defendants' argument that the current version of UREBA "expands" the
definition of "real estate" from its pre-1985 definition and "signals the legislature's
intention to apply UREBA's licensing requirements to a wider class of real estate-related
transactions"(Def. Br. 17), is untenable.
Even employing a "broad interpretation" of UREBA as Defendants urge, (Def. Br.
17-18), the usual and accepted meaning of the phrase "business opportunities involving
real property" used to define the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, would not
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be commonly understood as encompassing the act of finding a buyer for the stock of a
publicly traded corporation. Sachs, ffi[37-39
Additionally, given the well understood distinction between corporate stock sales
and asset sales under Utah law, e.g., Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc v. Dixie Power &
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990), Decius v. Action Collection Serv., 2004 UT
App 484, TJ8, 105 P.3d 956, had the legislature wished to abolish this distinction in
UREBA, it would have specifically declared this intent in the Act. That no such intention
is declared in UREBA further confirms the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
legislature did not intend to encompass the sale of corporate stock in the definition of
"real estate" in UREBA. Sachs, ^[48, n.23, citing Bertha v. Remy International, Inc., 414
F.Supp.2d 869, 877-878 (Wis. 2006) (Rejecting argument that Wisconsin legislature
would have included stock sales in definition of "real estate" in its real estate broker act
without specifically stating its intention to do so, given well established distinction
between stock sales and asset sales under Wisconsin law.)
Based on the legislative history, the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that
Prior to 1985, it may have been proper to substitute the terms 'existing
business' for the phrase 'business opportunities' in the definition of
'real estate', and then to inquire whether the existing business's
activities involved real property[,] [hjowever, since the 1985
amendments, inquiry is no longer appropriate. Instead, the proper
inquiry is to examine the specific character of the business
opportunity and to determine whether that opportunity involved real
property.
Sachs, 1f39
Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the sale of UPCM's
corporate stock is not a "business opportunity involving real property'' under UREBA,
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following this Court's long established practice of refusing to import substantive terms
into statutes.3 Sachs, ^ff[39, 49
3.

Defendants' Claim That The Court of Appeals Relied On Incomplete
Legislative History Was Not Presented In The Lower Courts. Thus,
The Court Should Decline To Consider This Claim

Defendants alternatively argue that the Court of Appeals "relied on an incomplete
record of UREBA's legislative history in reaching the foregoing conclusion." (Def. Br.
15). This claim is based on statements of sponsors of the 1985 amendments to UREBA,
which Defendants failed to present, brief or argue in the district court or in the Court of
Appeals. (Def. Br. 21-25) Thus, Defendants are in no position to criticize the Court of
Appeals for failing to consider this claim. (Def. Br. 15) As this Court has often stated:
"[T]his court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).
Because Defendants failed to present, brief or argue this claim in the district court
or in the Court of Appeals, the Court should decline to consider it. See, L&L: R. 10821083, 1124-1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct.

See, e.g., Andersen v. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725, 729 (Utah 1945) (Refusing to expand
the definitions of "real estate broker" and "real estate" in prior version of UREBA by
implication to require licensure for individual assisting licensed broker dealer in
obtaining listing); Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1951) (Holding that had the
Utah legislature not expressly included the terms "leasehold and other interest less than
leaseholds" in the definition of "real estate" in UREBA, the Court would likely have
interpreted the term "real estate" in UREBA [referring to a prior version of UREBA] as
not including oil and gas leases); IML. v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 110, ^}25 ("We will not
infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation
must be based on the language used, and we have no power to rewrite the statute to
conform to an intention not expressed.") (Internal citations and modifications omitted).
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App. Br. 19-36; UPCM Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005
UT 30,1J10, 116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting, Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d
412, 413 (Utah 1990) ("With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to
decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal."); See also, State v.
Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, \\2, 164 P.3d 1264 (refusing to address a legal argument
raised for the first time on appeal).
4.

The 1985 Amendments To UREBA Deleting The Definition Of
"Business Opportunity" and Adding The Words "Involving Real
Property" To Qualify The Term "Business Opportunities" In The
Definition Of "Real Estate" In §61-2-2(14) Are Substantive

Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing arguments, Defendants' claims
regarding the "legislative history" they contend the Court of Appeals failed to consider
(Def. Br. 21-25), are unavailing. Under Utah law "[E]very amendment not expressly
characterized as a clarification carries a rebuttable presumption that it is intended to
change existing legal rights and liabilities." State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah App.
1992), quoting State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); See also,
Madsen v. Borthrick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.l 1 (Utah 1988).
Defendants quote the statements of sponsors of the 1985 amendments describing
certain of the amendments as "clarifying what they did back in 1983" (Def. Br. 22)
(Emphasis supplied), referring to legislative action relating to the 1983 reorganization
removing real estate licensing and enforcement from the aegis of the state securities
commission. However, this does not mean that the 1985 amendments to UREBA at issue
in this case, namely: (1) the deletion of the then-existing definition of "business
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opportunities", and (2) the addition of the phrase "involving real property" to the term
"business opportunities" used in defining "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), are not substantive
per se. These amendments are clearly substantive because their effect was to further limit
the type of transactions for which a real estate license is required under UREBA. Sachs,
ffi[47- 48 Thus, Defendants fail to make any persuasive argument for disregarding the
presumption that an amendment is intended to change existing legal rights. See, Madsen
v. Borthrick, 769 P.2d 245, 252, n.l 1 (Utah 1988), citing 1A Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction §22.30 (Sands 4th rev. ed. 1985).
Defendants' argument that the 1985 amendments to UREBA at issue here are not
substantive, (Def. Br. 23-25), such that the controlling definition of "business
opportunities involving real property" is purportedly to be found in the repealed
definition of "business opportunity" in the 1983 version of UREBA, also transgresses a
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation. This rule assumes that assumes the
legislature acted advisedly in enacting these amendments and that the 1983 statute should
not be interpreted in a manner that renders the 1985 amendments superfluous. Sachs,
f39; See also, Madsen, supra, at 252, n.l 1; Visitor Information Center Authority of
Grand County v. Customer Service Div., Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198
(Utah 1997) ("The fact that the legislature felt that this change was necessary, however,
provides no support for reading the plain language of the statute as it existed prior to
1996 to make this amendment superfluous. Later versions of a statute do not necessarily
reveal the intent behind an earlier version.") (Internal citations omitted).
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Defendants also seek to bolster their new claim by quoting Justice Nehring's
concurring opinion in Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. Utah, 2006 UT 9,1J93, 131 P.3d
208 (Def. Br. 23) (note: the quoted language actually appears in ^92 of Public
Employees). Justice Nehring opined that the fact that neither the sponsors nor the
legislators discussing the amendment to the statute at issue in Public Employees indicated
that the amendment was intended to modify the substance of the pre-aimendment
language, supported an interpretation of the amendment consistent with pre-amendment
law, where the concept omitted in the amendment remained in another provision of the
amended statute. Id. ^[97. Here, however, the definition of "business opportunities"
deleted in the 1985 amendments to UREBA is not retained in another provision of
UREBA. Sachs, ^[38 Thus, Public Employees does not apply. See also, Sill v. Hart, 2007
UT 45, Ifl 1, n.3,ffi[12-13,162 P.3d 1099 (Declining to ignore limiting language provided
in legislative amendment and overall purpose of statutory scheme in interpreting statute.)
Defendants further argue that "[H|ere, the legislature did not remove the term
'business opportunities' from the definition of'real estate', it simply deleted the
definition of 'business opportunity,'" and that "[h]ad the legislature intended to remove
the term... from the definition of real estate, it would have done so in 1985 [or
succeeding years]." (Def. Br. 25) True enough, but these points are not in contention.
The issue is here is how the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" in
§61-2-2(14) should be interpreted in light of the fact that in 1985, the legislature
affirmatively repealed the definition of "business opportunities" that existed prior to the
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1985 amendments to UREBA and added the phrase "involving real property" to qualify
the term "business opportunities" in defining "real estate" under §61-2-2(14).
Based on the legislative history, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the
legislature no longer intended to define the phrase "business opportunities" as it had in
1983, and that the proper inquiry under the phrase "business opportunities involving real
property" in §61-2-2(14) of the amended version of UREBA, "is to examine the specific
character of the business opportunity and to determine whether that opportunity involved
real property." Sachs, ^39 Under the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals properly
determined that "the business opportunity at issue is the purchase of all of UPCM's
capital stock." Id. 1J40.
F.

Defendants' Claim That The Judiciary Should Defer To The Real Estate
Commission's Definition of "Business Opportunities" Was Not Presented In
The Lower Courts And This Court Should Decline To Consider It.
Alternatively, The Claim Is Inapplicable Under The Facts Of This Case
Defendants claim that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the Real

Estate Commission's interpretation of the term "business opportunities." (Def. Br. 26-28)
The Court should decline to consider this claim because Defendants never asserted,
briefed or argued this claim in the district court or in the Utah Court of Appeals, See,
L&L:R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 19861995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Tindley v. Salt Lake City
School Dist., 2005 UT 30, flO, 116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting, Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd
ofEduc., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). Alternatively, and without waiving the
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foregoing argument, Plaintiff Sachs submits that Defendants' argument on this point is
incorrect and inapplicable to the facts in this case.
Defendants argue that, "The legislature explicitly granted the Real Estate
Commission rulemaking authority to administer UREBA, or, alternatively, implicitly
granted the Commission authority to define the term 'business opportunity' by removing
the definition of the term from the statute." (Def. Br. 26-28). These arguments are
unsupported and untenable. Defendants offer no legal or legislative authority to support
these assertions and UREBA is devoid of any statement of such legislative intent.
Moreover, the express rule making authority granted to the Commission pursuant to §612-5.5(l)(a) belies Defendants' "implicit authority" argument.
Defendants fail to acknowledge that the rule making authority of the Commission
is limited by the provision that such rules may not be "inconsistent with this chapter."
See, §61-2-5.5(l)(a), Addendum 6. Thus, the Commission was not free to ignore the
legislature's deletion of the definition of "business opportunity" and its addition of the
words "involving real property" to qualify the term "business opportunities" used in the
definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14). in the 1985 amendments to UREBA.
Accordingly, the Commission's contrary definition was not binding on the Utah Court of
Appeals and is not binding on this Court.
Defendants also argue that "an agency's interpretation of statutory language is
entitled to deference" based on Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588
(Utah 1991), (Def. Br. 26-27) (Emphasis supplied) This argument is incorrect for at least
three reasons.
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First, there is no indication that the Commission's definition of "business
opportunity" is an "interpretation of statutory language." (Emphasis supplied) This
definition appears in rule 162-1-2.1.2 of the Utah Administrative Code which provides
that, "Terms used in these rules are defined as follows:... ", indicating that the definitions
set forth relate only to the rules of the Commission. These rules concern the licensing and
regulation of real estate professionals. See, Utah Administrative Code, R 162, Real
Estate, 162-1 through R. 162-109, Addendum 7.
Second, the facts of this case are not akin to those in Morton. In Morton, the
plaintiff alleged that the Tax Commission erred in its construction and application of a
state statute in its findings of fact in a Tax Commission proceeding. The issue on appeal
was whether the Court should defer to the Tax Commission's interpretation of the statute
in the Tax Commission proceeding. Id. 557-558. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly,
Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (Def. Br. 27), involved the
Court's review of the Public Service Commission's interpretation of a statute in a
proceeding before the Commission. Conversely, this case does not involve any
proceeding before the Real Estate Commission. Thus, the issues concerning this Court's
deference to Commission rulings presented in Morton and Williams are not present.
Third, there is nothing to suggest that the Commission is in a better position than
[than the Court] to construe the meaning of the phrase "business opportunity involving
real property" in UREBA's definition of "real estate." See, Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus/ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42,1J45, 164 P.3d 384.
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Accordingly, Defendants' argument that Court of Appeals was required to defer to
the Commission's definition of "business opportunity" is incorrect and should be
rejected.
G.

Other States' Interpretations Of Their Real Estate Broker Acts Are Not
Conclusive On The Interpretation Of UREBA Under Utah Law
In determining that the UREBA phrase "business opportunity involving real

property" does not encompass a sale of corporate stock where the corporation retains its
real property assets, the Utah Court of Appeals held that Utah "join[s] those jurisdictions
that recognize a distinction between the sale of assets and the sale of stock for purposes
of applying statutes regulating the activities of real estate brokers. " Sachs, ^|43
In so holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that, "some jurisdictions have
interpreted similar acts of their legislatures as including the sale of a business through a
stock transfer" and that "in some instances, there are statutory differences that support a
contrary approach." Sachs, at ffl|44-45 Based on this analysis, the Court of Appeals held
that, "Regardless of which position boasts the higher number of decisions, for the reasons
stated in this opinion, we conclude that the Utah Legislature did not intend UREBA to
apply to the sale of corporate stock." Sachs, ^f43
Defendants argue that "a survey of case law and statutes from other jurisdictions
confirms that the term 'business opportunities' includes the sale of an existing business
through the transfer of its stock." (Def. Mem. 28-29). However, most of the decisions
cited by Defendants do not contradict the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of
UREBA because they either involve real property asset sales, which this case does not, or
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because the real estate broker licensing statutes in those states contain explicit language
requiring a real estate broker license for transactions for which no real estate broker
license is required under UREBA.4 See also, Sachs, ffi[44-45.
For example, Lieffv. Medco Prof I Sews. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1998), (cited Def. Br. 29), involved the sale of 100% of the stock of a corporation
for which the Colorado Court of Appeals held a brokers license was required. However,
the Colorado statute requires a broker license for a broad range of transactions, including
transactions involving a
".. .business or business opportunity or the goodwill thereof or any
interest therein when such act or transaction involves, directly or
indirectly, any change in the ownership or interest in real estate, or in
a leasehold interest or estate, or in a business or business opportunity
which owns an interest in real estate."
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-61-10 l(2)(i) (Emphasis supplied), See also, Sachs, at f44, n.
21.

4

See, e.g. Shochet Secur., Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(cited Def. Br. 28) (Stock sale under Florida act defining "broker" as .. .a person
who.. .takes part in the procuring of... purchases of business enterprises or business
opportunities...);Lieffv. MedcoProflServs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App.
1998), (cited Def. Br. 29) (See discussion above, at 35); Broughall v. Black Forest Dev.
Co., 593 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 1978), (cited Def. Br. 29) (Asset sale of radio station
including leasehold interest under Colorado statute); Spring v. Rosauer, 641P.2d 1216,
1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (cited Def. Br. 29) (Stock sale under Washington act
defining "business opportunity" as including business, business opportunity and good
will of an existing business or any one or combination thereof); Schmitt v. Coad, 604
P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (cited Def. Br. 29) (same statute as in Spring);
Idaho statute defining "business opportunity" as including "established business, good
will of an established business, or any interest therein, or any one (1) combination
thereof."(Def. Br. 29, n.8)

35

However, UREBA lacks such broad and explicit definitions, and the term
"business opportunities" in UREBA must be interpreted in light of its limiting phrase
"involving real property" in §61-2-2(14). Sachs, ffi[38-39
The remaining cases cited by Defendants involve decisions that turn on the courts'
statutory construction of state real estate broker acts, based on an analysis of the
particular legislative history and development of those state statutes.5 However,
Defendants provide no legal authority compelling Utah courts to adopt the same
interpretation of UREBA. (Def. Mem. 28-30)
Defendants also fail to demonstrate any error in the Court of Appeals' analysis of
the development of Utah law treating stock as personal property, the history of legislative
reorganization that in 1983 split real estate licensing and enforcement from that of
securities in Utah, the purposes and policies behind UREBA, and the well understood
difference between corporate stock sales and asset sales under Utah law, that support the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of UREBA as excluding the purchase of corporate stock.
Sac/tf,^40-43, 45-51
Although Defendants criticize the Court of Appeals' reliance on Gruber v. OwensIllinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366 (3rd Cir. 1990), as "misplaced" because Pennsylvania's
licensing act does not define "real estate" to include "business opportunities", (Def. Br.
30), the Court of Appeals relied on Gruber for its reasoning that commercial transactions
5 See, e.g., Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 84-88 (3rd Cir. 1991) (cited Def. Mem. 28)
(finding New Jersey statute applicable to sale of stock) and Everett v. Goodloe, 602
S.E.2d 284, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (cited Def. Mem. 29) (finding Georgia statute
applicable to sale of corporate stock).
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characterized by the purchase of shares in an existing corporation through stock
acquisitions "would be distorted if the corporate form of sale were ignored, particularly
when it is recognized that the title and ownership of whatever real estate may be involved
in the sale remains within the corporate body, under the corporate name, and never
changes hands." Sachs, ^[43 The Court of Appeals correctly held that "this long
recognized principle should not be ignored lightly, nor without clear direction from the
Utah Legislature." Id.
Although Defendants claim that "all but one of the cases cited by the Court of
Appeals are similarly inapposite, because the statutes in the cited cases did not define
"real estate" as including "business opportunities" (Def. Br. n. 9), this argument is
incorrect. The Court of Appeals cited these cases as examples of states that preserve the
distinction between corporate stock sales and asset sales, and consequently, do not
interpret their real estate broker licensing acts as encompassing a corporate stock
transaction where the corporation retains its real property assets in the transaction. Sachs,
H43,n.l9
H.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Declined To Interpret UREBA As
Encompassing Transactions Involving Exclusively The Sale Of Corporate
Stock Where The Legislature Has Not Declared Its Intention To Do So
Defendants criticize the Court of Appeals' interpretation of "business

opportunities" as "restrictive" and purportedly leaving the term "without any effect or
consequence." (Def. Mem. 31-32) However, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that
the term "business opportunity" cannot be defined apart from its qualifying phrase
"involving real property" in the definition of "real estate" under §61-2-2(14) of UREBA.
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Sachs, Tf38 Thus, the issue here is was not whether the sale of UPCM's stock constituted
a "business opportunity", but whether it constituted a "business opportunity involving
real property" within the meaning of §61-2-2 (14). Sachs, ^[40
To the extent that the statutory phrase "business opportunity involving real
property" may be interpreted differently based on other facts, the Court of Appeals was
only required to interpret the phrase in light of the facts presented in this case. "The
function of appellate courts, like that of courts generally, is not to give opinions on
merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual controversies injuriously
affecting the rights of some party to the litigation." McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190,
1191 (Utah 1974). Defendants fail to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of UREBA is incorrect under the facts of this case.
I.

The Court Of Appeals Correctly Held That "Real Estate" In UREBA Does
Not Encompass The Sale Of A Corporation's Stock Based On The Long
Recognized Distinction Under Utah Law Between Stock Sales And Real
Property Asset Sales
Defendants do not dispute the Court of Appeals' conclusions that "the business

opportunity at issue is the purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock," Sachs, 1flf4l* and that
"corporate shares constitute a property interest quite distinct from the capital or tangible
assets of the corporation." Sachs, ^42 Although Defendants argue that the Court of
Appeals held that "a sale of securities can never be a sale of real estate" (Def. Br. 32), the
Court of Appeals did not address this broad issue and made no such sweeping
pronouncement.
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While it may be, as Defendants assert, that "it is the legislature's prerogative to
define the sale of stock in a corporation holding real property... as a business opportunity
involving real estate and, therefore, a sale of real estate" (Def. Br. 33), the Utah Court of
Appeals correctly declined Defendants' invitation to import a such a substantive
definition into the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" in §61-2-2(14)
of UREBA, where the Utah legislature has not unambiguously declared its intention to do
so. Sachs, 1ffi36-42, 46-49
Defendants alternatively argue that "the Court of Appeal's (sic) reliance on the
form of the transaction rests on an anachronism" because "at the time Sachs found
Jackson, no one -including Sachs - knew what form the transaction would ultimately
take." (Def. Br. 33) This argument is also incorrect. Although Plaintiff Sachs did not
know that the sale of UPCM would ultimately take the form of a merger because Sachs'
involvement was limited to finding a buyer for UPCM, it is undisputed that Sachs never
offered or agreed, nor did Lesser ever request Sachs, to find a buyer for any real property
assets of UPCM. To the contrary, Lesser instructed Sachs that to find him someone who
would buy UPCM outright. See, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts, f 11 at 8, Tfl4, at 9. Thus,
Sachs, who was a shareholder in UPCM and knew that UPCM was a publicly held
corporation, could reasonably infer that Capital's purchase of UPCM would involve the
acquisition of 100% of UPCM's outstanding capital stock. Id., f 1, at 5. The fact that
Sachs knew that the value of UPCM lay in its real property (Def. Br. 33), is also
irrelevant, in light of the facts that Sachs never offered or agreed, and Lesser never

39

requested Sachs, to sell any real property assets of UPCM, Id., ffi[ 14-15, at 9-10, and that
UPCM retained its real estate assets in the merger transaction. Id., ^23, at 12.
Defendants also argue that a "person may become subject to UREBA, and its
penalties, as a consequence of decisions of third parties made after that person has
completed his services" (Def. Br. 34-35). Defendants failed to assert, brief or argue this
claim in the district court or in the Court of Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 11241129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 1936; UPCM Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Thus, this Court should decline to consider it for the first
time on certiorari. Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, f 10, 116 P.3d 295,
298, quoting, Espinalv. Salt Lake City Bd ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants' argument
is incorrect. Under the Court of Appeals" interpretation of UREBA, an individual seeking
a finder's fee in relation to the purchase of a corporation's real property assets is
protected from civil and criminal penalties under UREBA by obtaining a real estate
broker's license. If the seller ultimately decides to sell the stock of the corporation rather
than its real property assets, the individual will not suffer any penalty under UREBA
because the Act does not apply to transactions for the sale of a corporation's stock where
the corporation retains its real estate assets in the transaction. Sachs, f43
Conversely, if a corporation agrees to pay an individual a finder's fee for finding a
buyer for all of its stock and later decides the sell the corporation's real property assets,
as opposed to its stock, the individual would have to have a real estate broker's license
under UREBA to recover a finder's fee. However, the individual could not be penalized
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under UREBA, because the individual never agreed to find a buyer for the real property
assets of the corporation and had no intent to do so.6 Thus, the imposition of criminal
penalties under UREBA is in no way contingent on any "after the fact discretionary
action of a third party," as Defendants erroneously portray.
J.

The Court Of Appeals' Interpretation Of UREBA Is Consistent With
Constitutional And Statutory Requirements Of Due Process And Equal
Protection
Defendants further argue that, "the Court of Appeals' interpretation of UREBA

renders the statute constitutionally suspect" and "introduces significant equal protection
and due process concerns whereas Defendants' interpretation avoids such problems."
(Def. Br. 33-35). Again, Defendants never asserted, briefed or argued this claim in the
district court or in the Court of Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 20682082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM
Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Thus, the Court should decline to consider this claim. "With limited
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for
the first time on appeal." Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 UT 30, ^flO, n. 2,
116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc., 797 P.2d 412, 413
(Utah 1990).
Alternatively, without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants' argument is
incorrect. The Court of Appeals' decision interpreting UREBA as excluding transactions
6

Section 76-2-101(l)(a) provides that: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless the
person's conduct is prohibited by law; and (b)(i) the person acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the
statute defining the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or (ii) the person's
acts constitute an offense involving strict liability."
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exclusively involving corporate stock, confirms to the general public that UREB A does
not apply to such transactions. Sachs,ffl[42-43 This interpretation is consistent with a
common sense reading of §61-2-2(14) because a citizen looking at the statute would not
commonly understand "a business opportunity involving real estate" to encompass the
sale of a corporation's stock where the corporation retains its real property assets.
The Court of Appeals also recognized that UREB A carries both civil and criminal
•-I

penalties for its violation, including fines and imprisonment. Sachs, ^[18-19 Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the phrase "business opportunities involving real
property" in §61-2-2(14) of UREB A, as excluding the sale of corporate stock where the
corporation retains its real estate assets, to prevent the criminalization of innocent
conduct not specifically prohibited by UREB A.8 This interpretation is consistent with
the requirements for constitutional due process 9 and comports with decisions of Utah

Pursuant to §68-3-4, civil and criminal penalties are not merged. This statute provides
that "When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal remedy, the right to
prosecute the one is not merged in the other."
Although Defendants argued in the Court of Appeals that UREB A is not a "penal"
statute, Brief of Appellee Lesser and Loeb, at 24-26, Brief of Appellee UPCM, at 19-23,
Defendants cite no Utah case to support this argument and Utah courts have traditionally
considered criminal and civil statutes imposing substantial monetary and criminal
penalties to be penal in nature. See, Arts Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property
Management, Inc., 2006 UT 45, till 0-12, 143 P.3d 278 (Utah Forcible Detainer statute);
State of Utah v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49,ffii17-19, 98 P.3d 420 (Utah Controlled Substances
Act); IML. v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 110,1J21, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah criminal libel
statute), Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1949)
(Utah statute providing double damages for wrongful failure to discharge or release
mortgage).
9

Section 76-1-106 provides that, "All provisions of this code and offenses defined by
the laws of this state shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to
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appellate courts interpreting statutes to avoid subjecting citizens to statutory civil and
criminal penalties where statutes do not clearly prohibit their challenged conduct. See,
e.g., State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ^16 (Adopting common sense interpretation of child
endangerment statute to preclude criminalization of otherwise legal conduct); State v.
Mooney, 2004 UT 49, If 17, 98 P.3d 420 ("Due process guarantees do not permit
enforcement of a penal statute that forbids an act in terms so vague that persons of
ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's meaning and differ as to its
application.")
By contrast, Defendants' interpretation of the definition of "real estate" in UREBA
does not abide with a common sense understanding of the statute, and does not afford
citizens due process notice that "a business opportunity involving real property" includes
transactions involving the sale of corporate stock. Thus, in Shochet Securities v. First
Union Corporation, 663 F. Supp. 1035 (U.S.D.C. Fla. 1987), a federal district court held
a Florida real estate broker licensing statute prohibiting payment of a commission to
anyone who is not licensed under the statute, unconstitutional as applied to a securities
broker who sought a fee on the sale of corporate stock. The court held that the title of the
statute violated a provision of the Florida Constitution requiring that statutory titles give
notice of subject of the statute, in that the title of the Florida real estate broker statute
only referred to real property and real estate brokers. Id. at 1037-1038.

promote justice and effect the objects of law and the general purposes of §76-1-104." In
turn, Section 76-1-104(2) identifies one of the general purposes of the laws of the State of
Utah as being "to define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each
offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal."
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Likewise, in this case, Article VI, §22 of the Utah Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall
be clearly expressed in its title." The purpose of this constitutional requirement "is not a
technical restriction on the legislature^ but its] practical purpose is to inform the
legislature and the public what legislation is proposed, and [to insure] a title is sufficient
that will lead to an inquiry into body of act..." State v. Kallas, 97 Utaih 492, 94 P.2d 414,
418-419 (Utah 1939). As in Shochet, the bills and laws relating to UREBA have been
consistently titled as relating to "real estate" and did not provide notice to the legislature
or the citizens of Utah that UREBA was intended to cover transactions exclusively
involving the sale of corporate stock.10 Thus, adopting Defendants' interpretation of
UREBA as encompassing such transactions would present the same constitutional due
process notice problem addressed in Shochet.
Based upon the foregoing legal authorities, it is Defendants' interpretation of
UREBA that raises constitutional due process problems, whereas the Plaintiff Sachs'
interpretation poses no constitutional infirmity. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d
838, 845 (Utah 1990) ("If alternative constructions of a statute are possible, we should
adopt the one that leads to a minimum of constitutional conflict.")

10

See, e.g., H.B. No. 284, Laws of Utah 1985, Chapter 162 "Real Estate
Amendments"; H.B. 102, Utah 1996 Session Laws, "Division of Real Estate-General
Amendments"; S.B. 198, Utah 2003 Session Laws, "Division of Real Estate-Definitions
Amendment; S.B. 172, Utah 2005 Session Laws, Chapter 199, "Division of Real Estate
Amendments" Addendum 9.
44

K

The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of UREBA Is Consistent With The
Purposes and Policies of the Statute And Does Not Elevate Form Over
Substance
Contrary to Defendants' argument, the Court of Appeals' decision does not

"elevate form over substance." (Def. Br. 35-36) The Court of Appeals specifically
rejected this argument, stating that, "[w]e cannot agree that the sale of the stock of a
corporation is legally equivalent to the sale of its assets. Nor do we believe that the
distinction between the two elevates form over substance." Sachs, f 50 The Court of
Appeals further observed that, "Utah has long recognized the importance of the separate
legal identity of the corporation and has been unwilling to permit parties to ignore those
distinctions." Sachs, ^51 (citing cases)
As the Court of Appeals reasoned, "Capital chose to structure its acquisition of
UPCM as a stock rather than an asset purchase... The difference in a buyer's assumption
of liabilities when entering into a stock purchase agreement versus an asset purchase
agreement is well known in the business community.... Defendants should not be
permitted to enjoy the benefits of UPCM's separate corporate structure for some purposes
while also claiming it elevates form over substance in an attempt to defeat Sachs' claim
for a finder's fee." Sachs, ^51
L.

The Court of Appeals' Interpretation Of UREBA Is Consistent With the
Purposes Of UREBA And Does Not Invite Abuse
Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals' decision undermines the purposes of

UREBA and "elevates form over substance" based on the theoretical possibility that an
"an unscrupulous and unlicensed broker" might structure a transaction to avoid the
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licensing requirements of UREBA. (Def. Br. 35-36) Defendants' hypothetical is wholly
irrelevant to the facts of this case. Here, it is uncontested that Defendants themselves
structured the transaction as the sale of UPCM's stock and Plaintiff Sachs played no role
in the transaction. (Def. Br. 14) As the Court of Appeals aptly found,
UREBA was adopted 'for the protection of members of the public
who rely on licensed real estate brokers and salespeople to perform
tasks that require a high degree of honesty and integrity.'
Sachs, TJ49 Thus, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of UREBA as not encompassing an
agreement to find a buyer for 100% of the stock of a publicly traded corporation "is
consistent with the purpose of the Act because it is highly unlikely that unsophisticated
members of the public will be party to a merger which results in one corporation
purchasing 100% of the common stock of another." Id. The Court of Appeals also correctly reasoned that, "the purpose of UREBA "is not
to protect real estate developers who seek relief from their own contractual obligations."
Id., citing Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Dev. Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah
1980). Sachs, ^49 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Defendants were
sophisticated real estate brokers and investors, represented by numerous attorneys and an
investment banking firm. See, Statement of Facts,ffl[6,25 at 7, 13. As such, Defendants
are not within the class of residential buyers and sellers that the licensing requirements of
UREBA were designed to protect. Accordingly, Defendants should not be permitted to
assert Plaintiff Sachs' non-licensure under UREBA as a shield against Plaintiff Sachs'
legitimate claim for a finder's fee, even if UREBA does apply to the subject transaction,
which Plaintiff Sachs disputes. See, American Rural Cellular v. Systems Comm., 890
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P.2d 1035, 1040-1041 (UtahApp. 1995) (Legislature's adoption of statutory bar to
recovery does not preclude application of previous common law exception to the general
rule of non-recovery where individuals asserting statutory bar are not within class of
persons designed to be protected by licensing requirement.)
Additionally, Defendants' argument that the sale of the stock of a corporation is
equivalent to a sale of its assets (Def. Br. 34-35), cites no legal authority to counter the
Court of Appeals' finding and conclusion that, "Utah has long recognized the separate
legal identity of corporations and has been unwilling to permit parties to ignore those
distinctions." Sachs, \5\ (citing cases)
Finally, while criticizing the Court of Appeals for a purported lack of
"jurisprudential pragmatism" (Def. Br. 36), Defendants fail to meet the Court of Appeals'
pragmatic concern that "Defendants' position raises additional questions, including the
amount of real property that must be owned by the subject corporation and the number of
shares that must be transferred before the licensing requirements of UREBA would be
triggered." Sachs, f51 As the Court of Appeals queried, "Would the sale of a single share
of UPCM stock over the New York Stock Exchange require a Utah real estate license?"
Id. The Court of Appeals' decision to construe UREBA in a manner that avoids this
issue in the absence of any expressed legislative directive is correct and does not "elevate
form over substance" as Defendants contend.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly held that UREBA
does not preclude Plaintiff Sachs' claims against Defendants for breach of implied
contract and this Court should affirm its decision.
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POINT II

A.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT
APPLY TO AN AGREEMENT TO FIND A BUYER FOR THE
STOCK OF A CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE FOR A FEE

The Plain Words Of The Utah Statute Of Frauds Do Not Require That An
Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of A Corporation Must Be In
Writing To Be Enforceable
Section 25-5-4 of the Utah statute of frauds provides that "every agreement

authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation" is "void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." Utah
Code Ann. §25-5-4(1 )(e), Addendum 4. The Court of Appeals held that, "Even
assuming, without deciding, that the Utah statute of frauds utilizes the same definition of
"real estate" as UREBA, Sachs' alleged finder's fee agreement falls outside the reach of
that statute for the same reasons that UREBA is inapplicable. Specifically, because stock
in a corporation is personalty, not realty. §25-5-4 of Utah's statute of frauds does not
apply to brokerage agreements for the sale of exclusively personal property." Sachs, f 52
Defendants argue that this conclusion is incorrect and that §25-5-4 prohibits an
oral agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a corporation for a fee, when read "in para
materia" with the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA. (Def Br. 36-38)
However, this argument implicitly concedes that the plain language of §25-5-4(1 )(e) does
not require such an agreement to be in writing to be enforceable. Moreover, the statute of
frauds is not cross-referenced to UREBA and gives no indication that it is intended to be
interpreted "in para materia" with UREBA. See, §25-5-4, Addendum 4.
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The Court of Appeals also correctly determined that Defendants' "in para materia"
argument is flawed, because neither UREBA nor the statute of frauds, separately or
together, provides that a transaction involving exclusively the sale of corporate stock,
constitutes "real estate", within the meaning of §25-5-4 of the Utah statute of frauds.
Sachs, %52
Finally, Defendants fail to counter the Court of Appeals' conclusion that excluding
corporate stock transactions from the definition of "real estate" in UREB A, is consistent
with §70A-8-l 12 (2001), which bars the application of the statute of frauds to contracts
for the sale or purchase of securities n , and is also consistent with the Court of Appeals'
decision in Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In
Mackintosh, the Court held that an oral agreement for services in exchange for a 10%
interest in the profits of a partnership's real estate developments was not barred by the
statute of frauds because the claim was not for an interest in real property per se and thus
did not fall within the statute of frauds. Id. at 1302. Sachs, f 53 Based upon the foregoing
legal authority, the Court of Appeals correctly held that, "Similarly, the purchase of the
shares of UPCM gave Capital an interest in only the profits and losses of the corporation

11

Utah Code Ann. §70A-8-l 12 provides that: "A contract or modification of a contract
for the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable whether or not there is a writing
signed or authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even if the
contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year of its making."
See also, Uniform Commercial Code Comment to §70A-8-l 12 ("For securities
transactions, whatever benefits a statute of frauds may play in filtering out fraudulent
claims are outweighed by the obstacles it places in the development of modern
commercial practices in the securities business.")
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and did not represent any legal interest in its real property assets" such that the statute of
frauds does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claim to a finder's fee." Id.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that neither UREBA nor the Utah statute of
frauds bars Plaintiff Sachs' implied contract claims against Defendants. Thus, Plaintiff
Sachs respectfully requests the Court to affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
and to remand the case to the district court for trial on the merits.
DATED AND RESPECTULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of November, 2007.
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